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30 
ANOTHER THEORY OF INSUFFICIENT 
ACTIVITY LEVELS 
Mark Grady*† 
A response to David Gilo & Ehud Guttel, Negligence and Insufficient  
Activity: The Missing Paradigm in Torts, 108 Mich L. Rev. 277 (2009). 
Introduction 
Professors David Gilo and Ehud Guttel have written an important article 
on the tendency of the negligence rule to produce inefficiently low activity 
levels. In Negligence and Insufficient Activity: The Missing Paradigm in 
Torts, the authors claim insufficient activity to be the “missing paradigm” in 
tort theory. Although I agree with Gilo and Guttel that this missing para-
digm is central to negligence doctrine, I disagree with them about how 
insufficient activity levels arise. 
I. Gilo and Guttel’s Reliance on “Lumpy” Precaution 
The Gilo-Guttel model is interesting, but it seems out of step with nor-
mal economic reasoning. Everything in the authors’ model turns on their 
assumption that some precaution is lumpy. As that term is commonly used 
by economists, a “lumpy” asset is also “nondifferentiable” (in the mathe-
matical sense) because it exists in only one relevant quantity and quality. In 
more common parlance, a lumpy asset is nonscaleable.  Gilo and Guttel as-
sume that the railroad has only one spark arrester choice. This spark arrester 
is so productive that it produces a socially efficient activity level of eight 
train runs. Nevertheless, the spark arrester is expensive relative to the vari-
able-cost precautions, which are indeed continuously differentiable. These 
unconventional assumptions move the authors’ model toward a corner solu-
tion at which the railroad maximizes its private profits by reducing its 
activity level to a point at which the lumpy spark arrester just barely fails to 
pay off (under the Learned Hand formula) and therefore does not need to be 
installed. This low activity level (five train runs) is well below the social 
optimum of eight train runs, as the authors stress. In effect, the lumpiness of 
the spark arrester in combination with the Hand formula yields insufficient 
activity levels as rational actors seek to avoid a lumpy investment. 
                                                                                                                      
 * Professor and Director, Center for Law and Economics, UCLA School of Law. 
 † Suggested citation: Mark Grady, Response, Another Theory of Insufficient Activity Lev-
els, 108 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 30 (2009), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/ 
assets/fi/108/grady.pdf. 
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The authors’ critical assumption is that spark arresters come in only one 
grade. If instead spark arresters came in several grades, or even if lumpy 
spark arresters possessed nonlumpy substitutes, the authors’ corner solution 
would disappear. Because the negligence rule allows injurers to externalize 
some of the costs of increasing activity levels upon victims, most econo-
mists believe that the negligence rule can actually yield economically 
excessive activity levels. Gilo and Guttel reason that this standard result 
may not obtain in a model where one precaution lacks continuous differenti-
ability and the other precaution possesses it. 
II. Is Precaution Likely to be Lumpy? 
Perhaps economists’ assumption that economic functions should be dif-
ferentiable has led us astray. Gilo and Guttel refer to their lumpy precaution 
(the spark arrester) as a “fixed-cost” precaution, but we should start with the 
recognition that it is not a “fixed-cost” precaution in the standard economic 
sense. 
In standard production theory, after a factory has been built, the plant it-
self is indeed a fixed cost because the owner must pay the mortgage whether 
production occurs or not. Then, the entrepreneur hires labor, which is a vari-
able cost for two reasons: (1) you need more labor to produce more output; 
and (2) you can fire labor in the short run. If demand for your product in-
creases, the only way to increase the production in the short run is to hire 
more labor (the variable-cost resource). Based on this scenario, production 
theory yields a number of economic lessons and principles, such as the 
long-run shut-down point, the short-run shut-down point, the decreasing 
marginal product of labor given a particular factory size, and so forth. Gilo 
and Guttel fail to stress, however, that economists almost always assume 
that productive resources are continuously differentiable. Fixed-cost assets 
are only fixed in the short run, not because they are inherently lumpy, but 
because the entrepreneur has irrevocably invested in a factory (or other du-
rable asset) of a particular quality and quantity. Gilo and Guttel’s model is 
more extreme in that they assume nondifferentiable costs and assets in the 
long run. 
Economists usually deny that nondifferentiable costs and assets exist. If 
lumpy resources were common, production theory would be totally differ-
ent. When I wrote an early article about contributory and comparative 
negligence, I read a number of spark arrester cases. In Gilo and Guttel’s fa-
vor, I cannot specifically remember a case in which an issue ever arose 
about the quality of the defendant’s spark arrester. Having admitted this, 
however, I still doubt that spark arresters were the lumpy assets that our au-
thors posit. These cases gave me the impression that part of a spark 
arrester’s cost was the loss of thermodynamic efficiency from placing the 
spark-catching screen over the train’s exhaust. The finer this screen, the 
more effective but also the more costly the spark arrester became, because 
the screen made the steam locomotive burn more fuel per mile. Since screen 
gauge seems continuously differentiable, cost would be too. The railroad 
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could always increase the gauge of the mesh and thus have a cheaper spark 
arrester. 
Gilo and Guttel’s examples from actual cases also fail to show that 
lumpy precautions are so common that society should be worried about their 
activity-level-reducing effects. In one case, they describe the supposedly 
lumpy precaution of noise insulation of machinery. But, might the insulation 
be thick or thin or placed only on the noisiest machines? In other words, 
contrary to the authors’ model, the cost of this precaution seems fully scale-
able. Another case example entails railings on bleachers. Nevertheless, 
railings can be either numerous or few and either strong or weak. Perhaps 
the authors’ best case example in support of their theory is a bartender that a 
defendant hotel could have assigned to a private party at which a guest be-
came so drunk that he ran into a tree and hurt himself. Nevertheless, 
bartenders can work a shift that is focused more or less on hours when 
heavy drinkers will likely overindulge. Thus, even this best example fails to 
demonstrate that precaution cost is frequently lumpy. 
III. How the Negligence System Can Actually  
Produce Insufficient Activity 
I have previously published my own theory about how the negligence 
rule can yield insufficient activity levels. I posit that precautions can use-
fully be seen as “durable”—like a fire escape—or “nondurable”—like a fire 
escape inspection. Despite Gilo and Guttel’s suggestion (in their footnote 
42), neither of these precautions is a “fixed-cost” precaution in their sense 
of entailing lumpiness or nondifferentiable cost. In my model, fire escapes 
come in continuously differentiable grades. They can go up to the top floor 
or only to the first floor; they can be relatively maintenance-free or the op-
posite; they can be made of steel or wood, and so forth. In my definition, a 
“durable” precaution—as its name suggests—lasts a long time. Once you 
install a fire escape, you typically don’t have to install another one soon. 
Nondurable precaution is the opposite. If you inspect the fire escape this 
month to see whether the bottom stairway still falls to the ground when 
loaded with escapees, you might have to do it again in another six months. 
In fact, reasonable care might require this inspection every month if it is 
sufficiently cheap and productive. Obviously nondurable precaution also 
entails variable cost. 
As I have previously explained, my reason for the distinction is that 
courts are highly intolerant of lapses in nondurable precaution—so intoler-
ant that the legal rule governing their use is more like the economist’s 
conception of strict liability than of negligence. Theoretically, if you forget 
to install a fire escape, courts would be equally intolerant, but one could 
say—quite accurately—that the “opportunity set” for judicial intolerance is 
greater the more often a precaution has to be remembered and therefore may 
not be remembered. Thus, as a practical matter, durable precautions are cov-
ered by the rule economists know as the Hand formula; whereas nondurable 
precautions are covered by a stricter liability rule, which only lawyers and 
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judges know as “negligence” and which economists would likely call “strict 
liability,” if they knew more about it. 
It is relatively easy to comply with the Hand formula, which applies 
most directly to durable precautions. You need only use cost-beneficial pre-
caution. It can be very hard—often totally uneconomic—to comply with the 
corresponding legal rule that applies to nondurable precautions. This rule 
requires one to remember every single (reasonable) inspection at its ap-
pointed time. 
It follows that most negligent behavior experienced in the real world 
will entail lapses in nondurable precaution. Given the harshness of the neg-
ligence rule, it is often efficient for people to be negligent, as I have also 
pointed out previously. Consider a surgeon who vows to count every single 
sponge before she closes her patients in each of the thousands of surgeries 
that she conducts over her lifetime. Although this (hypothetical) surgeon 
might be the only one who has fully complied with the negligence standard, 
it is unlikely that this surgeon has been “efficient.” That is why most negli-
gence in the operating room is a lapse in a nondurable precaution as 
opposed to a failure to install a durable precaution such as medical equip-
ment of the proper quality. 
This analysis reveals a deep paradox in the civil liability system. The rate 
of negligence in the economy will be directly proportionate to the productivity 
of nondurable precaution. Moreover, basic safety technology—such as the 
invention of the dialysis machine for kidney failure, the invention of the air 
brake for trains, or even the invention of the surgical technique for doing ap-
pendectomies for the first time—will almost always increase, not decrease, 
the productivity of complementary nondurable precaution. Here then is the 
paradox: basic safety technology often increases the rate and amount of negli-
gent behavior. When you install air brakes, you now can be negligent in ways 
that simply did not exist before. Your engineer has to keep better lookouts 
(which were relatively useless before brakes) and your brakepeople have to 
inspect the brakes constantly, which of course they didn’t have to do at all 
before airbrakes were invented. 
Having heard the foregoing reasoning, many people initially suspect that 
this problem must be the result of “judicial error.” It is not. Instead, the 
problem has to do with real and unavoidable judicial measurement costs. 
Courts cannot easily assess whether a given surgeon has been counting 
sponges at an efficiently high rate or at an inefficiently low rate or whether a 
particular lapse fell in the efficient zone or in the inefficient zone. Instead, 
because of these substantial and real measurement costs, courts either make 
surgeons liable for all lapses or else—a modern trend—give juries the 
power to absolve some surgical lapses more or less randomly. This absolu-
tion, however, comes only after the erring surgeon has incurred substantial 
costs to fight the case against her. Indeed, the modern trend of allowing jury 
absolution, while not much noted in the economic literature, may respond to 
the “problem” of what I have recently called “compliance-using” technol-
ogy—that is, modern technology that requires high rates of nondurable 
precaution. 
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Strict liability for lapses in nondurable precautions can easily cause inef-
ficiently low activity levels, as I have also argued before in articles cited by 
Gilo and Guttel. The problem is most acute where the plaintiff and the de-
fendant have a contractual relationship. Consider the invention of the first 
high-tech incubator for extremely premature babies. Although this early 
incubator may have yielded many pediatric miracles, it was probably unfor-
giving of human error. In other words, it radically increased the productivity 
of nondurable precaution by nurses and other pediatric ward technicians. In 
fact, an early but ambitious incubator probably required constant attention 
of a type that led to many outstanding negligence cases against the medical 
personnel who all too predictably failed to achieve the perfection that the 
negligence rule requires. Although parents of lost babies possessed strong 
negligence cases for the nurses’ and technicians’ lapses in nondurable pre-
caution, they (or someone) paid upfront for the liability. Because, moreover, 
the subsequent liability did not truly compensate the parents for their lost 
babies—a damages award can only compensate for a financial loss—the 
upfront liability premium was a poor ex ante deal for the parents. In addi-
tion, tort liability has high administrative costs, which also need to be 
recovered ex ante by efficiently run hospitals. As a consequence, these par-
ents (or their insurance companies), through their unwillingness to pay the 
ex ante liability premiums that were needed to pay them ex post for efficient 
negligence, probably reduced their demands for incubation to lower levels, 
maybe “insufficient” levels. (There is a “Nirvana-fallacy” problem here, but 
that is a second-order question, which I do not have the space to discuss.) 
Here is another example: when airbag technology was first invented, the 
automobile companies claimed that it was ineffective. They could have been 
saying that consumers were unwilling to pay the ex ante liability premiums 
for early but ambitious technology that probably would have required many 
nondurable precautions by manufacturers and dealers to manufacture and to 
maintain. If this is correct, then this technology was probably not introduced 
swiftly enough to satisfy at least the most formal notions of economic effi-
ciency even when the delay could have been a rational response by 
automobile manufacturers to the actual legal rule that punishes every lapse 
in a nondurable precaution, efficient as well as inefficient lapses. Think of 
the business case that would be made against the early introduction of air-
bag technology that would have saved many lives at low cost but which 
would have also generated large liability awards for efficient manufacturing 
and servicing lapses in nondurable precaution. 
Another paradox is that the problem of insufficient activity should be 
less severe in noncontractual scenarios, which is maybe why we see an un-
usually constrained type of negligence rule in many contractual settings, 
such as Winterbottom v. Wright, to pick an early case. To see this point, 
think of United States v. Carroll Towing Co., the most important negligence 
case of the legal economist’s canon. The case arose only because the plain-
tiff’s bargee was not on the scene to correct for the defendants’ prior 
negligence of tying the plaintiffs’ barges lines too loosely after the defen-
dants had freed another barge in order to move it. Tying lines is, of course, a 
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nondurable precaution, and the defendants lapsed on this one occasion and 
were liable jointly with the barge owner—the plaintiff. The harbormaster’s 
one failure among (probably) tens of thousands of successful knots led 
Judge Hand to the conclusion that the harbormaster had been negligent in 
the most obvious way. Judge Hand did not even launch his formula against 
this issue of the defendants’ negligence, because the proper legal conclusion 
was so clear to him. Here is the legal principle that was so obvious to Judge 
Hand: strict liability exists for a defendant’s lapse in nondurable precaution. 
You might think that someone strictly liable for tying lines would ineffi-
ciently reduce their activity. Nevertheless, the plaintiff—the barge owner—
was a contractual stranger to the defendants, and the defendants therefore 
were not in a position to charge the plaintiff an ex ante liability premium 
that might have reduced the activity of line-tying (in the same way that the 
activity of incubation can be reduced by a lack of demand for legal liability 
among parents of premature babies or their insurance companies). 
Even if no contractual conduit exists between a plaintiff and a defen-
dant, you still might think that strict liability for common lapses could 
reduce activity levels, and it probably does so to some extent. The adminis-
trative costs from using the courts to punish efficient lapses could yield this 
result. Nevertheless, plaintiffs (and even third parties) possess important, 
though little noticed, obligations to use more precaution because they have 
seen or should have anticipated someone else’s possibly efficient lapse in 
nondurable precaution. Thus, in an ideal world, when the harbormaster has 
entered the truly costly zone of 99.9999999 percent perfection in tying lines 
and has then efficiently lapsed, the plaintiff will respond by using the simple 
“corrective” precaution of noticing that the line has not been tied properly or 
staying on the barge during working hours and avoid the occasion for a law-
suit and its administrative expense. This incentive created by the doctrines 
of contributory and comparative negligence thus reduces the administrative 
costs of litigating over efficient lapses and correspondingly increases activ-
ity levels. In fact, you could easily regard the wish to preserve this incentive 
as the real justification for Judge Hand’s ruling in the Carroll Towing case. 
He gave the following as his reason for why it was negligent for the plain-
tiff’s bargee to have been absent: 
Certainly it was not beyond reasonable expectation that, with the inevi-
table haste and bustle [in the wartime New York harbor], the work [of 
line tying] might not be done with adequate care. In such circumstances 
we hold—and it is all that we do hold—that it was a fair requirement that 
the Conners Company [the plaintiff] should have a bargee aboard (unless 
he had some excuse for his absence), during the working hours of day-
light. 
In this most famous of all negligence cases, Judge Hand’s formula im-
posed an obligation on victims to correct for the prior actual or anticipated 
negligence of injurers in order to help sustain efficient activity levels in the 
maritime industry. 
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In conclusion, I commend the authors for tackling such an important 
problem and join with them in hoping that their stress and analysis of insuf-
ficient activity levels will lead to a new paradigm of tort liability. 
